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State-Level Carbon Taxes and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause: Can Formulary 
Apportionment Save the World? 
Darien Shanske* 
INTRODUCTION 
A carbon price is coming, or so it would seem. Even though 
in the United States there have only been a handful of successful 
state-level efforts,1 large firms are assuming that a price will be 
placed on their greenhouse gas emissions.2 Yet until recently, it 
was unclear as a practical matter how a national price for carbon 
was going to get established.3 Indeed, it is still unclear, but one 
possible avenue has opened up. This is because in June 2014, the 
Environment Protection Agency (“EPA”) released draft rules 
mandating significant reduction in the release of carbon, a 
greenhouse gas. Specifically, by 2030 these rules aim to “achieve 
CO2 emission reductions from the power sector of approximately 
30 percent from CO2 emission levels in 2005.”4 These rules give 
states great flexibility in achieving the required reductions.5 
 
 * I would like to thank all the participants in the 2014 Chapman Law Review 
Symposium on Business Tax Reform. I would also like to thank Ash Bhagwat, Dan 
Farber, David Gamage, Carlton Larson, John Swain, and Michael Wara. I was largely 
inspired to write this piece after reading the analysis of related issues by Mark Gergen 
and discussing them with him and the NorCal Tax Roundtable. Mark P. Gergen, The 
Case in Economic Theory for Wrapping a Carbon Tax Around Cap and Trade 6 (Aug. 27, 
2013) (unpublished paper), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Gergen_09 
092013.pdf. I am grateful to thank Mike Parnes for excellent research support. All 
mistakes are my own. 
 1 For instance, there is California’s AB 32. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500 
(West 2014). 
 2 Coral Davenport, Large Companies Prepared to Pay Price on Carbon, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 5, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/business/energy-
environment/large-companies-prepared-to-pay-price-on-carbon.html?_r=0&pagewanted=p 
rint; Carbon Copy, ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/business/ 
21591601-some-firms-are-preparing-carbon-price-would-make-big-difference-carbon-copy. 
 3  Much less an international price, especially since so much attention has been 
focused on what the United States has done—or not done. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, 
Governments Await Obama’s Move on Carbon to Gauge U.S. Climate Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 27, 2014, at A11. 
 4 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,832 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. 60.5700), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-06-
18/pdf/2014-13726.pdf. 
 5 Id. at 34,834–35. 
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Though imposition of a carbon tax is not explicitly mentioned one 
way or another in the draft rules as an acceptable approach, 
market-based approaches, such as California’s cap and trade 
regime, are explicitly held up as possible models.6 Accordingly, 
The New York Times reported that “E.P.A. officials said states 
could even choose to comply by enacting a state-level tax on 
carbon pollution.”7 In any event, and even before the EPA 
announcement, there has been some interest in the states in 
establishing a state-level carbon tax.8  
This Article is about one specific aspect of the design of a 
state-level carbon tax.9 I will not be arguing whether or not, on 
balance, a state-level carbon tax is a good idea, though in fact I 
do believe that it is.10 There are many thorny design issues 
relating to a carbon tax at any level of government—for instance, 
should it be structured as a payment made by consumers, sort of 
like a retail sales tax,11 or should it be structured as a levy 
imposed at certain carbon-intensive choke points? I will not be 
addressing such issues either in any detail; though, for the sake 
of the argument, I will stipulate some simple carbon tax 
structures. 
 
 6 See id. at 34,882 (“[A] state could change the relative costs of generation for more 
carbon-intensive and less carbon-intensive generating units by imposing a cost on carbon 
emissions. A state could do so through any of several market-based mechanisms.”). 
 7 Coral Davenport & Peter Baker, Taking Page from Health Care Act, Obama 
Climate Plan Relies on States, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2014, at A16. For the argument that 
the EPA has the authority to approve state plans that rely on the carbon tax, see SAMUEL 
D. EISENBERG, MICHAEL WARA, ADELE MORRIS, MARTA R. DARBY & JOEL MINOR, A STATE 
TAX APPROACH TO REGULATING GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2014), 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/05/22-state-tax-regulating-
greenhouse-gas-clean-air-act-morris. 
 8 See, e.g., Henry J. Reske, State Studying Possibility of Carbon Tax, 70 ST. TAX 
NOTES 735, 735 (2013). Of course, the primary state-level experiments to date have been 
with cap and trade, and these systems too could become a national model. 
 9 Strictly speaking, carbon dioxide is only one form of greenhouse gas—that is, the 
type of gas implicated in causing global warming. As will be noted below, I will not be 
assuming that the carbon tax imposed by a state would only be on carbon. However, I will 
be following Metcalf and Weisbach by labeling this tax a “carbon tax” even if it applies to 
other gases as well. See Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon 
Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 500 (2009). The tax in British Columbia, for example, 
does only tax carbon. See David G. Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, 10 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 87, 93 (2008). 
 10 For useful summaries of the arguments, see Donald B. Marron & Eric J. Toder, 
Tax Policy Issues in Designing a Carbon Tax, AM. ECON. REV., May 2014, at 563; Adele 
Morris, An EPA-Sanctioned State-Based Carbon Tax Could Reduce Emissions and 
Improve State Finances, BROOKINGS (Apr. 1, 2014, 5:10 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
blogs/up-front/posts/2014/04/01-epa-carbon-tax-can-help-environment-state-finances-morr 
is; Roberta F. Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax: How to Overcome Politics and Find 
Our Green Destiny, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,118 (2009). 
 11 See Dan Farber, The Possible Merits of a Hybrid Sales+Carbon Tax, LEGALPLANET 
(Oct. 8, 2012), http://legal-planet.org/2012/10/08/the-possible-merits-of-a-hybrid-salescarb 
on-tax/. 
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So what will I be discussing? I will be addressing whether 
the federal Constitution, and in particular the judicially crafted 
dormant Commerce Clause (“DCC”), prevents a state from 
imposing border tax adjustments (“BTAs”) as part of its carbon 
tax. There are strong arguments that the DCC would pose an 
obstacle. In particular, any border adjustments would have to be 
somewhat imprecise, but the Supreme Court has been very 
miserly about permitting an approximately compensating tax to 
fall on imports to a state.12 But perhaps this is going too quickly. 
There are several routes by which a properly designed carbon tax 
with border tax adjustments might pass muster.13 
I. OUTLINE OF A CARBON TAX  
I will not be writing about the details of carbon tax design, 
but we should outline at least a reasonable design of a carbon tax 
so that we can understand the problem that might come before a 
court. My outline will roughly follow the carbon tax design 
proposed by Gilbert Metcalf and David Weisbach.  
Most, eighty percent, of the greenhouse gas produced in our 
economy is produced by fossil fuels.14 Fossil fuel production 
occurs via a number of chokepoints, such as refineries, of which 
there are under 200 in the United States.15 So let us suppose that 
 
 12 Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: Potential Constitutional Impediments to the 
Regulation of Global Warming, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835, 880–81 (2008) (doubting 
complementary tax doctrine can save border adjustments). But see William Funk, 
Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs: The Northeast 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a Case in Point, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 353, 
366–67 (2009) (providing a slightly more optimistic analysis). 
 13 Note that border adjustments imposed by a state would also likely raise issues 
related to international trade. These issues are beyond the scope of this Article, though 
note that at least some commentators plausibly see the issues as largely analogous, and 
thus perhaps a solution within the U.S. federal system might suggest an answer 
internationally. Mark P. Gergen, The Case in Economic Theory for Wrapping a Carbon 
Tax Around Cap and Trade 6 (Aug. 27, 2013) (unpublished paper), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Gergen_09 092013.pdf; see also Joost Pauwelyn, Carbon 
Leakage Measures and Border Tax Adjustments Under WTO Law, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND THE WTO 448 (Geert Van Calster & Denise 
Prévost eds., 2013) (explaining why border tax adjustments might be permissible under 
international trade law); Carol McAusland & Nouri Najjar, Carbon Footprint Taxes § 5 
(Oct. 24, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://people.landfood.ubc.ca/ 
carol.mcausland/McAusland%20Najjar%20Carbon%20Footprint%20Taxes.pdf (detailed 
discussion of WTO issues). Or perhaps not. Indeed, if state border tax adjustments did 
cause sufficient problems for the United States, then they might be struck down 
domestically as running afoul of the Foreign dormant Commerce Clause. See Japan Lines, 
Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 453–54 (1979). 
 14 Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 9, at 522. 
 15 Id. at 523. 
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a state imposes a $15/metric ton tax on carbon, collected at 
refineries.16 
This new tax will make exports from the taxing state more 
expensive and imports to the state cheaper. To illustrate this, let 
us focus on a different concrete example: concrete. The process of 
concrete production produces carbon over and above the energy 
that the production of concrete requires.17 There are only a small 
number of cement plants in the United States, and thus this is 
another good time and place to impose a carbon tax. So, suppose 
Oregon imposes a carbon tax; it will thereby significantly 
disadvantage its domestic concrete producers not only in the 
export market, but also within the state.18 Note that this 
disadvantage is not a result of anything the Oregon producer has 
or has not done; the disparity is a result of the fact that this 
producer is based in a state trying to mitigate a worldwide 
externality, but, by hypothesis, many other states are not.19  
This economic problem is also an environmental problem and 
a political problem. Obviously, if more expensive Oregon concrete 
is replaced by cheaper out-of-state concrete made cheaper 
because of a lack of a carbon tax, then the carbon tax will not 
only hurt Oregon business, but it will not reduce total carbon 
emissions. This problem is called “leakage.” Naturally, the 
prospect of economic harm suffered for no environmental gain is 
likely to hurt the political prospects of any such reform right 
from the start. 
The direct fix is to credit the Oregon producer for all of the 
concrete that she is exporting and impose an equivalent tax on 
imports of concrete. In this case, it is perhaps easy enough for 
Oregon to estimate the carbon tax it has imposed on the concrete 
and to strip it out, and also to add this cost to imports. The 
Oregon concrete producer would pay a per unit tax on its 
concrete and then get a refund for the concrete it exported. A 
concrete importer would then need to pay the same per unit cost 
 
 16 Note that this price is higher than the current price on the European or California 
exchanges, where the numbers are approximately $6.70 and $11.50, respectively. Carbon 
Copy, supra note 2. This price is much lower than that used by at least some large firms. 
Exxon Mobil is reportedly using $60/ton. Id. 
 17 Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 9, at 530. 
 18 Cf. JENNY H. LIU & JEFF RENFRO, NW. ECON. RESEARCH CTR., CARBON TAX AND 
SHIFT: HOW TO MAKE IT WORK FOR OREGON’S ECONOMY 15 (2013), available at 
http://www.pdx.edu/nerc/carbontax2013.pdf (identifying the problem). 
 19 Metcalf & Weisbach, supra note 9, at 540. Note also that a whole other issue is 
raised if the other state (or nation) is trying to control carbon emissions, but in a manner 
not directly comparable—e.g., California’s cap and trade system. We will leave those 
questions to the side for the moment, though note that the same basic analysis should 
apply should one state try to unilaterally adjust its regime to cope with the different 
carbon prices set by other jurisdictions (say through using an adjustable credit). 
Do Not Delete 9/27/2014 10:16 PM 
2014] Carbon Taxes and the Dormant Commerce Clause 195 
when it imports concrete.20 However, because this tax would be 
specifically on imports, would this tax not be constitutionally 
prohibited as a facial discrimination? This is our first doctrinal 
question. 
Even more perplexing, if Oregon is to truly achieve its goals, 
it will need also to use approximations based on the origin of 
goods and services. That is, it is likely cheaper to produce 
concrete in a state that has cheaper—but let us suppose more 
carbon intensive—power sources. Assuming that Oregon could 
impose some type of border adjustment, could it impose one that 
ultimately takes into account the origin of a good or service? Let’s 
return to our Oregon concrete producer and suppose it is paying 
1 x per unit in carbon taxes. Under these adjustments, an 
out-of-state importer may need to pay 1.2 x per unit—or perhaps 
0.9 x—depending on the origin of the concrete. As for out-of-state 
producers paying more, this seems to be an even more blatant 
facial discrimination. This is our second question. Our third 
question has to do with how carbon intensity is being measured, 
as surely it is just an approximation. How much imprecision, if 
any, is permissible? 
And so these are the three doctrinal questions posed by 
border tax adjustments: (1) Can there be any special tax at all on 
imports, even if it is the same as a tax on domestic production? 
(2) Could a state differentiate its border adjustments between 
products based on approximations of their carbon intensity if 
such approximations take geography into account? (3) Even if 
questions one and two are answered in the affirmative, how 
much approximation is permissible? 
II. THE PRIMA FACIE ANSWERS: BORDER ADJUSTMENTS ARE 
DOOMED 
The Supreme Court imposes an almost per se rule of 
invalidity as to taxes that discriminate between in-state and 
out-of-state taxpayers. Thus, the answer to the second question, 
about applying different rates to products based on the different 
carbon footprints of different states or regions, is very likely to be 
“no” and that would seem to be the end of the story whatever the 
answers to the other questions.21 Indeed, out-of-state producers 
 
 20 This is an easy example; how would one strip out the carbon tax from in-state 
services? This is why it is important to apply the tax at just a few points where this kind 
of calculation is at least roughly possible. 
 21 See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(Smith, J., dissenting); see also Joseph Allan MacDougald, Why Climate Law Must Be 
Federal: The Clash Between Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and State Greenhouse Gas 
Trading Systems, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1431, 1435 (2008) (similar analysis). 
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seem necessarily to be at a disadvantage to the extent that the 
border adjustment takes into account the additional carbon 
burned in transporting a product. 
As to the first and third questions—can there be a special 
import charge at all and how much imprecision is permissible—
the Court has tolerated special taxes on imports (the use tax) 
only when they precisely matched up with a tax on domestic 
consumption (the sales tax).22 Because assessing the carbon 
intensity of both domestic and imported products is going to be 
the product of informed guesswork, it looks like such a practice 
will not pass muster either. Thus, the answer to the first and 
third questions is also “no.” 
A.  First Counterargument: There Is Not a Facial 
Discrimination 
California is in the midst of implementing a cap and trade 
system (“AB 32”) for controlling greenhouse gasses. A cap and 
trade system and a carbon tax can function in exactly the same 
way; both are trying to place a price on carbon in order to 
encourage conservation. The tax is a tax and so is clearly a cost. 
In cap and trade, polluters need to pay for the privilege to 
pollute, which is also a cost. One downside to cap and trade is 
that it imposes a significant burden on the regulator to try to 
estimate how much different industries pollute, and thus how 
many credits they will need to purchase. If the regulator gets this 
wrong, all manner of problems can result. For instance, on a 
system-wide level, if the regulator sells too many permits at too 
low a price (or gives them away), then the desired reductions will 
not occur.23 Within an industry, if the regulator incorrectly 
requires Firm A to purchase more permits than Firm B, then 
Firm B is given a comparative advantage wholly because of the 
regulation. This should sound familiar because it is the same 
problem that spurred us to consider border tax adjustments. 
As part of its implementation of AB 32, California’s cap and 
trade system, California’s Air Resources Board (“CARB”) adopted 
a Low Carbon Fuel Standard. This standard sets an annual limit 
on the carbon intensity of fuels; blenders of fuels over the limit 
must purchase credits from blenders below the limit. In order to 
assess how a particular fuel did relative to the standard, CARB 
had to develop a complicated metric that differentiated among 
 
 22 See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583–84 (1937). 
 23 This is essentially what happened to the European Trading System. See ETS, 
RIP?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/ 
21576388-failure-reform-europes-carbon-market-will-reverberate-round-world-ets.  
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fuels by region (among other things). The rationale for 
differentiating between regions was that there were differences 
in the carbon intensity of fuels produced in different places. If 
California wanted its system to actually reduce carbon, it needed 
to rely on such metrics. 
A federal district court struck down the California Fuel 
Standard. Among other reasons, and the key reason for our 
purposes, the court found that taking into account the source of 
fuels was a facial discrimination that failed strict scrutiny.24 A 
panel of the Ninth Circuit overturned the district court by a vote 
of 2 to 1.25 Crucially, the panel only overturned the case as to the 
facial constitutional challenge to the fuel standard, and thus the 
standard may still be found wanting after a fact-intensive 
analysis.26 The full Ninth Circuit refused to hear the case en 
banc.27 The Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari.28 
As to the facial discrimination argument, the majority 
reasoned that there was no facial discrimination because the 
California regulations were not targeting out-of-state producers 
because they produced out-of-state; rather, the regulations were 
motivated by and based on an entirely different concern, namely 
measuring carbon intensity.29 Sometimes in-state producers did 
better by this metric and sometimes not.30 California was not 
basing its regulations on state borders.  
Interestingly, though this was not formally a tax case, the 
decision revolved around several key DCC tax cases.31 
Conceptually, this makes sense because, as noted above, 
regulations and taxes are often policy substitutes. Accordingly, 
though Supreme Court cases seem to apply a different test to 
taxes versus regulations, I know of no case where the Court says 
 
 24 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, Nos. CV–F–09–2234 LJO DLB, 
CV–F–10–163 LJO DLB, 2011 WL 6936368 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011). 
 25 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 26 This point was emphasized by the author of the Ninth Circuit decision in his 
concurrence to the denial of the hearing en banc. Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 510 (9th Cir. 2014) (Gould, J., concurring). 
 27 Id. at 513. 
 28 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, No. 13–1148, 2014 WL 1118399, at *1 
(U.S. June 30, 2014). 
 29 Corey, 730 F.3d at 1089 (“[T]he Fuel Standard does not base its treatment on a 
fuel’s origin but on its carbon intensity. The Fuel Standard performs lifecycle analysis to 
measure the carbon intensity of all fuel pathways.”). The dissent disagreed with this 
characterization of the fuel standard. Id. at 1108 (Murguia, J., dissenting). Note that this 
factual dispute might be decisive in this case, but the doctrinal argument would still 
stand that if a regulation truly did not base itself on geography, then it would not count as 
a facial discrimination. 
 30 Id. at 1083–84 (majority opinion) (noting California ethanol producers pay more 
because they import midwestern corn). 
 31 See, e.g., id. at 1089 (distinguishing Oregon Waste). 
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that there are different rules, or justifies different rules.32 In any 
event, the Ninth Circuit, in interpreting lead tax cases, seems to 
outline a promising strategy for defending a carbon tax with 
border adjustments, should it be properly designed from the 
start. Specifically, the carbon intensity framework needs to apply 
to all products and services. So long as the regulatory structure 
is sufficiently rigorous and based on factors other than 
jurisdictional lines, then it should pass muster even if some 
inputs take geography into account.  
An additional important feature of the California regulation 
is worth noting. The Fuel Standard works in general by setting 
defaults and then allowing firms to argue for individualized 
determinations.33 Thus, the majority opinion noted that any 
mischief caused by the general formulas—including to 
out-of-state producers—could be corrected.34 The dissent did not 
believe that these individualized determinations went far 
enough.35 It is not clear how important this issue ultimately was 
to the majority’s reasoning, but permitting individual firms to 
challenge a default seems to be a prudent feature should one 
wish to design a system that would be upheld under the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning.36 
B.  Second Counterargument: Even If There Is Facial 
Discrimination, Perhaps It Is Not Fatal Because of the 
Complementary Tax Doctrine 
As was appropriate, the majority opinion in Rocky Mountain 
hewed closely to Supreme Court precedent in arriving at its 
conclusion upholding California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard. 
Yet the majority in Rocky Mountain might not have hewed to 
existing precedent closely enough. Are there other routes to 
upholding border adjustments? I believe that there are. 
The first route is to argue that, under current doctrine, a 
border adjustment represents a complementary tax and, as such, 
the prima facie discrimination is not invalid because it 
“achiev[es] a legitimate local purpose that cannot be achieved 
through nondiscriminatory means.”37 The key modern application 
 
 32 See generally David Gamage & Darien Shanske, The Saga of State ‘Amazon’ 
Laws: Reflections on the Colorado Decision, 65 ST. TAX NOTES 197, 199 (2012). 
 33 Corey, 730 F.3d at 1082. 
 34 Id. at 1094; Corey, 740 F.3d at 510 (Gould, J., concurring). 
 35 Corey, 730 F.3d at 1109 (Murguia, J., dissenting). 
 36 By analogy, Gamage and Heckman have argued that a similar scheme—of a 
reasonable default that can be overcome—ought to allow states to require remote vendors 
to collect use taxes. David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State 
Taxation of E-Commerce, 92 B.U. L. REV. 483 (2012). 
 37 Or. Waste Sys. Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994). 
Do Not Delete 9/27/2014 10:16 PM 
2014] Carbon Taxes and the Dormant Commerce Clause 199 
of the doctrine is Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,38 where the 
Supreme Court upheld Washington’s imposition of a use tax on 
out-of-state purchases to compensate for the sales tax it imposed 
on sales made within the state. Thus, if the Court, or a court, 
does not accept the Rocky Mountain argument that there is no 
discrimination at all, then it might accept an argument based on 
the complementary tax doctrine that the discrimination is 
justified. Certainly, if the carbon tax were identically imposed on 
imports—that is, taking no account of carbon intensity—the case 
looks pretty strong. But what if, as seems important, a state did 
try to take the relative carbon intensity of imports into account? 
A leading recent case on the doctrine, and one seemingly 
similar to our scenario, is Oregon Waste Systems.39 In Oregon 
Waste Systems, Oregon imposed a surcharge on waste imported 
from out-of-state of $2.25/ton, while the in-state charge was 
$0.85/ton.40 Oregon’s statute required that the surcharge “be 
based on the costs to the State of Oregon and its political 
subdivisions of disposing of solid waste generated out-of-state 
which are not otherwise paid for.”41 Thus, Oregon had a colorable 
argument that its surcharge was compensating, but it failed the 
demanding three-part test for a discriminatory tax to be upheld 
as complementary.  
The test for complementary taxes is as follows: First, a 
special out-of-state burden must be identified. Second, the 
out-of-state surcharge has to approximate, but not exceed, the 
identified burden. Third, the event that triggers the in-state and 
out-of-state tax must be “substantially equivalent.”42 The Oregon 
scheme failed the first and third prongs—indeed it was a kind of 
Catch-22. The only identifiable charge was the charge paid by 
in-state producers, but this was only a third as much as charged 
to out-of-state producers. Thus, there was no identifiable burden. 
The State countered that the identified charge should take into 
account the general taxes that in-state producers paid but that 
out-of-state producers did not. Yet this argument ran smack into 
prong three; the occasion for paying a general property tax, for 
example, was not substantially equivalent to that of paying a 
special surcharge on imported waste. 
 
 38 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). 
 39 Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. 93; cf. 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, WALTER HELLERSTEIN 
& JOHN A. SWAIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 4.14.[3][c] (3d ed. 2012) (arguing that making the 
exception limited makes pragmatic and principled sense). 
 40 Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 96. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 103. 
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Taking a step back, accepting that compensating for general 
taxes would suffice does seem likely to lead to abuse and 
retaliation, and so the Court was on firm ground in Oregon Waste 
Systems.43 It is, however, quite another thing for a state to adopt 
a tax on a broad new tax base, namely carbon, and then try to 
mitigate its impact with border adjustments. This situation is 
much more analogous to Henneford—the case that upheld the 
use tax as a complement to the sales tax. Or, put another way, a 
border adjustment would be based on an identified event—the 
production of carbon—and that event is substantially identical 
wherever it happens. With prongs one and three covered, this 
brings us to prong two—whether the border adjustment 
calculation is close enough for purposes of the DCC, and herein 
lies the trouble, perhaps. The problem arises out of a different 
sales tax case. 
State sales taxes may be compensated by use taxes, but what 
about local sales taxes, say imposed at the county level? 
Presumably, an individual county can impose a use tax to 
complement its sales tax, but what if a state wanted to simplify 
matters by imposing a state-level use tax supplement that is the 
average of all local sales taxes? This is what Missouri did, 
imposing a 1.5% average use tax at the state level to compensate 
for the sales tax imposed by some 1000 localities.44 The Court in 
Lohman found that this added use tax violated prong two—a 
statewide average created a burden that was greater on imported 
goods in many instances, and it did not matter if this average 
helped importers the rest of the time.  
Lohman suggests that the approximations that would be the 
necessary basis for border adjustments under a state-level carbon 
tax may fail. After all, the methodology that a state would need 
to use would need to be an average or other kind of 
approximation,45 even if more individualized determination were 
also theoretically possible. However, these border adjustments 
could be distinguished from the average state-level sales tax at 
issue in Lohman. This is not a case where a statewide average is 
essentially whitewashing local discrimination, which was the 
Court’s concern.46 Here, the averages are being used to calculate 
what can only be calculated approximately even if a more 
 
 43 See also Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996). 
 44 Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 644 (1994). 
 45 Cf. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(noting California fuel standard uses averages). 
 46 Id. at 649–50. 
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individualized methodology were used; there is no underlying 
fact of the matter.47 
C.  Third Counterargument: Formulary Apportionment as a 
Model for Approximation 
The Court could still interpret Lohman differently. In 
particular, it might decide that it stands for a very broad 
principle: no averaging, only a precisely known amount can be 
compensated for. Or, relatedly, perhaps the Court would reason 
that there is an underlying fact about carbon intensity that can 
be discovered without a formula. The Court should be coaxed not 
to so interpret Lohman by reference to its formulary 
apportionment cases. 
The test of whether a tax scheme violates the DCC is called 
the Complete Auto Test (“CAT”).48 The second prong of the CAT 
bars discrimination; this test is very similar, perhaps identical, to 
the test for regulations. This is the prong we have essentially 
been discussing, but there is a third prong under the CAT: a tax 
must be fairly apportioned. Of course, if a tax is not fairly 
apportioned, then it is likely discriminatory, but this prong is not 
wholly duplicative. A typical apportionment formula, on its face, 
applies to all firms in the same way, whatever their location, but 
fair apportionment requires that that chosen method of 
apportionment be reasonable. The Court has long accepted rough 
formulas for apportioning the value or income of multi-state 
enterprises, such as using the relative amount of railroad track 
within a state.49 This is an area in which the Court accepted a 
reality on the ground, namely that railroads were multistate 
enterprises,50 the value of which could not be precisely located in 
a given state. The analogy with carbon production is strong. Let’s 
return to California’s fuel standard. It turns out that all fuels are 
 
 47 Furthermore, as discussed above, the border adjustment regime could allow for 
individual challenges to the results yielded by the more general methodology. See supra 
notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
 48 Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 49 See, e.g., Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); 
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Mo. State Tax Comm’n, 390 U.S. 317, 324 (1968) (“A number of 
such formulas have been sustained by the Court, even though it could not be 
demonstrated that the results they yielded were precise evaluations of assets located 
within the taxing State.”). Interestingly, this last case, Norfolk, is the rare case where the 
Court did find a formula irrational because there was a pre-existing value against which 
the Court could compare the value arrived at by formula. That is not the case as to carbon 
intensity. 
 50 A buried assumption is that the railroads are a “unitary business,” which is by no 
means always a simple matter to determine, but there is no question that the Court has 
accepted very large and disparate entities as sufficiently unitary to permit 
apportionment. See generally Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 
(1983).  
Do Not Delete 9/27/2014 10:16 PM 
202 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:1 
not the same in terms of carbon intensity. For instance, some fuel 
has ethanol and some of that ethanol comes from the American 
Midwest and some from Brazil. In general, entire processes are 
producing carbon, but exactly how much requires an estimation 
based on many factors, including geography. 
Two relatively recent apportionment precedents are 
particularly notable in supporting this analogy. First, there is 
Moorman.51 In Moorman, a manufacturer based in Illinois 
challenged Iowa’s use of a single-sales factor method of 
apportionment for the purpose of ascertaining where the income 
of a multistate corporation was earned (and therefore taxable).52 
The Illinois manufacturer noted that Illinois, like most states at 
the time, used a three-factor method of apportionment.53 This 
method looked to the relative proportion of sales, property, and 
payroll that a multistate corporation earned in a particular state. 
Iowa used only the sales factor.54 This choice of formula served to 
increase the income apportionable to Iowa of an Illinois business 
with Iowa sales, but to decrease the apportionable income of an 
Iowa business exporting to Illinois. Thus, Iowa’s then solitary use 
of the single sales factor seems to advantage its domestic 
businesses. Nevertheless, the Court upheld Iowa’s use of the 
single sales factor. At the heart of the Court’s reasoning was the 
observation that it was not Iowa’s formula that discriminated or 
was unreasonable; rather, it was the interaction of Iowa’s system 
with the different systems of other states. The Court refused to 
dictate and enforce a uniform formula.55 Moorman therefore 
stands for the principle that the Court will not pick and choose 
between formulas even if a chosen formula gives the state that 
adopts it an edge (or at least an apparent edge). 
The second important precedent is Trinova.56 In Trinova, the 
challenge was to Michigan’s use of formulary apportionment in 
connection with its value added tax.57 The plaintiffs asserted that 
value added could be more easily geographically located than 
total firm value or income, and thus use of a formula was 
unreasonable.58 The Court held otherwise.59 Presumably, 
Michigan could have attempted to locate value added more 
 
 51 Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978). 
 52 Id. at 269–72. 
 53 Id. at 276. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 278–79. 
 56 See generally Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358 (1991).  
 57 There was also a challenge to the formula as discriminatory, a challenge the Court 
summarily dismissed. Id. at 384–86. 
 58 Id. at 373–74. 
 59 Id. at 374. 
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precisely, but the State was permitted to use an approximate 
formula given the still significant complexity and guesswork 
involved in locating value added.60 
The formulary apportionment line of cases thus provides an 
argument, by analogy, that ought to buttress the use of 
approximate formulas for making border adjustments. If 
Michigan could use a formula rather than try to track down 
value added, then why can’t Oregon do something similar as to 
carbon intensity? Or, put another way, the plaintiffs in the 
formulary apportionment cases regularly insisted that they 
knew, via separate accounting, where the value or income of 
their firms was located. The Court has repeatedly rejected this 
contention; since locating multi-state firm value or income is like 
“slicing a shadow,”61 the states were not required to accept the 
shadow slices proffered by the plaintiffs. If this is true for firm 
value or income, why should this not be true for carbon intensity? 
III. SIDEBAR: APPLICATION OF THE SPIRIT OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY 
EXCEPTION? 
It must be granted that the Court could reject the fair 
apportionment analogy, instead holding that what is acceptable 
approximating under the fair apportionment prong of CAT is not 
necessarily acceptable under the anti-discrimination prong. As 
for anti-discrimination, no approximating is permitted. Yet there 
are hints in the Court’s recent DCC jurisprudence that it will not 
reach out to invalidate sensible state innovations. 
We should remember that the DCC is federal constitutional 
common law. The current DCC test for whether a tax passes 
constitutional muster, the four prong Complete Auto Test, was a 
result of a backwards look at what the Court had done in actual 
cases—while all the while overturning large parts of the doctrine 
to that point, and all in the name of forging a more pragmatic 
test.62 Since the advent of the Complete Auto Test in 1977, one 
 
 60 Id. at 379 (“The same factors that prevent determination of the geographic 
location where income is generated, factors such as functional integration, centralization 
of management, and economies of scale, make it impossible to determine the location of 
value added with exact precision.”).  
 61 Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 192 (1983). 
 62 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 277–78 (1977); cf. Jesse H. 
Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the Dormant Commerce Clause: The Object-
Measure Approach, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 199 (“The central problem with Complete 
Auto is that its four prongs are functionally overlapping and redundant in attempting to 
fulfill the bedrock constitutional value served by judicial review of state taxation of 
interstate commerce: nondiscrimination against interstate commerce.”).  
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prong has become largely irrelevant,63 another prong has taken 
on a surprising life of its own,64 and (at least) two additional 
prongs are tucked into one of the remaining two prongs.65 Thus, 
quite reasonably, Justice Scalia has written (with Justice 
Thomas concurring) that he “look[s] forward to the day when 
Complete Auto will take its rightful place . . . among the other 
useless and discarded tools of our negative Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.”66 Indeed, a current majority of the Court, writing 
through Chief Justice Roberts, has recently written that “[t]he 
dormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license for federal 
courts to decide what activities are appropriate for state and local 
government to undertake.”67 
This strong language comes from the Court’s 2007 decision 
in United Haulers.68 In that case, the Court essentially 
overturned a recent precedent69 in order to allow localities 
essentially to monopolize the local waste processing business. I 
have argued elsewhere that the best way to understand this 
decision is as accepting of a new economic reality.70 The waste 
management industry used to be one in which competition was 
possible. Yet, as the environmental impact of waste disposal has 
grown, so too has the expense of treating waste properly. Thus, 
as was the case apparently in the two-county region at issue in 
United Haulers, waste management had become a natural 
monopoly. That is, any one—very expensive—treatment plant 
could handle all the waste in the region. Adding a second plant 
would only be wasteful. In such a circumstance, the Court 
narrowed earlier precedent in order to allow governments to 
pursue an economically sensible solution to a regional problem; 
 
 63 The fourth prong, so-called “fair relation.” See Commonwealth Edison 
Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 610 (1981). 
 64 This is the first prong, “substantial nexus,” which was held in Quill to require a 
more substantial nexus than that required by the Due Process Clause. See Quill 
Corp. v. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1992). 
 65 The Court looks for the internal and external consistency of a tax; these 
requirements are sometimes placed under the anti-discrimination prong, and sometimes 
the fair apportionment prong. See, e.g., Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984) 
(internal consistency required under fair apportionment and anti-discrimination prongs); 
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (internal and external 
consistency under fair apportionment prong). 
 66 Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. at 201 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 67 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
343 (2007). 
 68 See id.  
 69 See generally C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). 
 70 Darien Shanske, The Supreme Court and the New Old Public Finance: A New Old 
Defense of the Court’s Recent Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 43 URB. LAW. 
659, 669 (2011). 
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namely, the governments were permitted to build one expensive 
plant and then force local waste haulers to use it.71 
By analogy, the problem of reducing carbon emissions is a 
new one and one that transcends state borders. The science and 
economics of carbon leakage are hard to gainsay—or at least 
inappropriate for a court to gainsay. Why should the Court reject 
all the doctrinal arguments made thus far only to hamstring 
state efforts to address what the Court has already accepted is a 
major problem?72 This is an apt place to review the arguments 
thus far to see just how many “off-ramps” are available to the 
Court, at least if confronted by a well-designed system of BTAs. 
First, following the argument of Rocky Mountain, the Court can 
find that there is simply no discrimination. Second, the Court 
could accept that BTAs satisfy the complementary tax doctrine as 
it currently stands. Third, the Court could accept that BTAs 
satisfy a slightly revised complementary tax doctrine through not 
holding it constitutionally problematic that the BTAs rely on 
approximations (as they must). This argument would rely on an 
analogy with formulary apportionment. The Court should be 
propelled to one of these routes by the same sense of its 
institutional limitations that led to the decision in United 
Haulers. 
But perhaps the Court will refuse to do so. Or, at any rate, 
perhaps the uncertainty here will, as a pragmatic matter, 
prevent the implementation of a robust carbon tax with BTAs. Is 
there another way to structure a carbon tax so as to achieve the 
benefits of BTAs?  
IV.  ALTERNATIVE DESIGN: FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT AS A 
SUBSTITUTE FOR BORDER ADJUSTMENTS 
Up to this point we have been considering formulary 
apportionment as an analogy for a border adjustment. Yet the 
mere fact that these adjustments would occur on imports (and 
exports) arguably might be too great a hurdle to clear with the 
Supreme Court. Fortunately, there is still one additional possible 
approach: replace border adjustments with formulary 
apportionment. 
Here is roughly how this might work. Instead of taxing a 
refinery as it refines oil, the carbon tax would tax the refining 
firm once a year in much the same way states currently 
 
 71 The Court has made similar adjustments to its doctrine in other, related, areas of 
law and, in particular, rate regulation where the Court ultimately decided to leave the 
setting of utility rates to expert regulators (for the most part). Id. at 714–16. 
 72 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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administer their corporate income tax. Take an oil refiner—the 
firm would report how much oil it refined for use in the state, but 
before that number became the basis of the carbon tax, the state 
would apply an apportionment formula based on the carbon 
intensity of the oil it imported.73 Thus, a firm that imports oil 
would need to pay its carbon tax after the amount of oil it 
imported was adjusted for the carbon intensity of its source, 
among other factors. As with current apportionment formulas, 
and as with California’s fuel standard, a taxpayer should be able 
to challenge the formula. Regardless of the statute, formulas can 
be challenged as unconstitutional because unreasonable. The 
standard state act for apportionment, the Uniform Division of 
Income for Tax Purposes Act (“UDITPA”), offers taxpayers the 
possibility of additional relief, even if a formula does not fall 
below the constitutional floor, and this should be the case with 
carbon formulary apportionment as well.74 
Here is a more detailed example of how this structure might 
work and how it differs from just using BTAs. Let’s go back to 
our basic carbon tax that charges a per unit charge on carbon 
and suppose, for a moment, that BTAs are acceptable. Now 
consider our Oregon hypothetical oil refiner. It has refined 
1,000,000 units for use in Oregon and it is also taxed $10 per unit 
for an initial liability of $10,000,000. Half the refined oil came 
from Oregon, half from Texas. The Texas oil is judged by 
Oregon’s methodology as more carbon intensive than that from 
Oregon. On those imports, the refiner is taxed at $12 per unit 
and so the refiner owes total carbon tax of $6,000,000 on this half 
of its production, for a total liability of $11,000,000. It is this 
additional surcharge in particular that, as we discussed, might 
doom the BTAs. 
What would apportionment look like? The refining company 
would file one annual return. In the current case of the corporate 
income tax, it is not known how much income is generated by a 
given state, and so one takes the total income a corporation has 
earned nationally and multiplies that number by some fraction—
say the portion of sales in a given state/total sales. This ratio of 
 
 73 See McAusland & Najjar, supra note 13 for a more detailed discussion of how such 
a system might work in terms of estimating the cost of carbon embodied in products. See 
also Charles E. McLure Jr., The Carbon-Added Tax: A CAT that Won’t Hunt, POL’Y 
OPTIONS, Oct. 2010, at 62, 66 (“The most efficient way to implement a carbon tax is to 
impose it upstream. It is true that an upstream carbon tax would not provide the 
information required to calculate BTAs; it should be necessary to calculate BTAs in some 
other ad hoc way . . . . Fortunately, BAs [border adjustments] would be needed for trade 
only in a limited number of carbon-intensive basic products that are traded heavily with 
countries that do not limit CO2 emissions.”). 
 74 UNIF. DIV. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 18 (1957). 
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in-state sales to all sales may not be very easy to compute, but it 
is the relatively known data point we are using to estimate the 
known unknown, namely the income that can be fairly 
apportioned to a given state. So, suppose our Oregon oil refiner 
earned $10,000,000 nationally. Then let’s assume that Oregon 
used only the sales factor to apportion income and the oil refiner 
made 10% of its sales in Oregon, then $1,000,000 of the refiner’s 
income would be taxable in Oregon. The calculation looks like 
this: 
 
Corporate Income Tax 
   Notes 




Formulas take political geography into account, 
often strategically. 
Taxable Base $1,000,000 Estimate resulting from formula. 
 
Note that Oregon has a choice of apportionment formulas 
and, like most states, has probably chosen its formula 
strategically. Market states tend to prefer using only the sales 
factor, especially if that is what neighboring states are using; 
natural resource rich states tend to hang on to use of the 
property factor.75 
In the case of this theoretical new carbon tax, we also have a 
problem figuring out the base—namely total carbon emissions. 
As with the current corporate income tax system, we do know 
some things that will be useful for estimating state carbon 
emissions. We know, for instance, the brute number of the 
amount of oil a refinery has refined for use in state.76 We also 
know, at least for the firm as a whole, where the oil came from.77 
We also know, thanks to the models of the type used by 
California 
 
 75 Darien Shanske, A New Theory of the State Corporate Income Tax: The State 
Corporate Income Tax as Retail Sales Tax Complement, 66 TAX L. REV. 305, 312–20 
(2013). 
 76 If we did not know the amount of oil refined for use in one state, then a reasonable 
formula could be applied here as well. Of course, the more formulas that are applied, the 
greater the deviation from the simple “God’s eye” example offered above, but that is 
alright because the underlying assumption here is precisely that this information is not 
known, and so reasonable approximations are permissible. 
 77 As observed in the note above—more precise information is to be preferred, but 
firm-wide formulas should be acceptable unless they reach results that would implicate 
the concerns of section 18 of UDITPA. 
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California, how intensive these various sources are. And so we 
get the following: 
 
Carbon Tax, Simple 
   Notes 
Total Raw Units 
in State 
1,000,000  
For instance, gallons of gasoline refined. This is 
assumed known. 
Weighting Formula 110% X  
 
Only takes environmental inputs into account, though 
these are geographically sensitive. 
Taxable Base 1,100,000  
 
Note that, at least at this point, there is a stronger 
constitutional argument for carbon apportionment versus single 
sales factor apportionment insofar as the formula is not based on 
strategic calculations, but on a best guess as to carbon intensity. 
But how does this system mimic border adjustments exactly? 
Returning to our example above, the key step would be to 
disaggregate the raw units by source and then to weigh them by 
carbon intensity, and so the calculation might look like this: 
 
Carbon Tax, Breaking Out Weighting 
   Notes 
Total Raw Units in State 1,000,000 
The weighing is only tangentially by “region.” It is 
instead based on relevant characteristics of the 
region, such as its primary energy inputs or 
methods of oil extraction, etc. 
 
Units from Region A 500,000 
Region A Weight 100% X 
Weighted Region A 500,000 
  
Units from Region B 500,000  
Region B Weight 120% *  
Weighted Region B 600,000  
   
Total Weighing 110%  
Taxable Base 1,100,000  
 
Note that, at least in this simple example, formulary 
apportionment has reached the same result as the border 
adjustment example above. 
Using formulary apportionment to avoid the need for border 
adjustments is not a novel idea. This was part of the reform 
proposal of the California Commission on the Twenty-First 
Century Economy (“COTCE”).78 The heart of the COTCE 
 
 78 STATE OF CAL. COMM. ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECON., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 
ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY (2009), available at http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/ 
reports/documents/Commission_on_the_21st_Century_Economy-Final_Report.pdf. 
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proposal was a state-level value added tax, called a Business Net 
Receipts Tax (“BNRT”). Yet imposing a broad new tax, it was 
feared, would disadvantage California businesses. The 
Commission did not believe it could impose border adjustments 
to strip out—or impose—its new tax. The COTCE proposal used 
formulary apportionment (only the sales factor) to try to make up 
for the lack of border adjustments. Unfortunately, and as critics 
noted, formulary apportionment cannot replace border 
adjustments in this context.79 For instance, actual exporters 
would have their BNRT reduced by use of the single sales factor 
because only in-state sales would be used in the formula, but 
those domestic producers who sell to the exporters would not see 
any reductions because all of their sales are in state. This is 
because the design of the BNRT did not allow the tax to be added 
or subtracted on a transaction-by-transaction basis.  
This criticism does not hold for a carbon tax, at least in the 
modified form we are discussing. The carbon tax would only be 
remitted by a handful of large producers; thus, there would not 
be the problem of many businesses having the carbon tax built 
into their prices without chance of rebate. Furthermore, the deep 
issue with relying on apportionment in the context of a 
value-added tax is that sales are different from value added. In 
the case of a carbon tax, the formula would be measuring carbon 
intensity, which is the same as the base of the tax.80 
CONCLUSION 
This short Article is not an argument for a carbon tax in any 
form, though clearly it assumes that one would be worth 
pursuing. Rather, in this Article I have taken on the common 
assumption that a particular, and oft-proposed, design feature of 
a carbon tax—border tax adjustments—is not possible for a 
state-level carbon tax in the United States. I think this 
assumption is incorrect, or at least it may be incorrect. If 
carefully designed, taking into account the precedents and 
arguments discussed here, I believe a carbon tax with border tax 
adjustments could survive dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges. Alternatively, I believe an upstream carbon tax that 
used formulary apportionment to approximate border 
 
 79 Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Business Net Receipts Tax: A Dog That Will Not Hunt, 
37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 745, 749–63 (2010); see also Kirk J. Stark, Houdini Tax 
Reform: Can California Escape Its Fiscal Straightjacket?, CAL. POL’Y OPTIONS, 2011, at 
171, 173. 
 80 I delve into some of the complexities of using sales as a proxy for income in 
another article. See Shanske, supra note 75, at 344–47. 
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adjustments is even more likely to survive dormant Commerce 
Clause scrutiny. 
 
